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Abstract
Using the latest spatial econometric techniques and data pertaining to 144 countries over the period 1993–2007, this
article tests and compares four frequently used spatial econometric models and eight matrices describing the mutual
relationships among the countries, all within a common framework, which helps clarify the impact of neighboring
countries on military expenditures. Furthermore, it utilizes two different data sources. Due to this setup, it provides
one of the most thorough spatial analyses of military expenditures so far. Furthermore, it confirms but also challenges
the results of several previous studies. Military spending measured as a ratio of GDP in one country indeed depends
primarily on the spending of other countries, but in a limited number of cases, it also depends on control variables
that can be observed in other countries, among which are the level of GDP, the occurrence of international wars, and
the political regime. The most likely specification of the matrix describing the relationships among countries is the
first-order binary contiguity matrix based on land or maritime borders, extended to include two-sided relationships
among the five countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council and one-sided relationships to all
other countries. Finally, cross-sectional approaches are rejected in favor of dynamic spatial panel data approaches due
to their controls for habit persistence, country, and time-period fixed effects.
Keywords
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Introduction
As noted by Collier & Hoeffler (2007) and many others,
the need for security is a crucial reason for spending
scarce government budgets on military force. Security
is difficult to quantify though, but models of arms races
(Richardson, 1960) and alliances (Sandler & Hartley,
2001) suggest that security is influenced by the military
expenditures of the country itself and that of other coun-
tries. In particular, there is a large literature devoted to
trying to explain the logarithm (log) of the ratio of the
military expenditure of a country to its gross domestic
product (GDP), often called the defense burden. This
will be determined by the defense burden in neighboring
countries, and possibly other variables in these countries.
These co-determinants in the dependent variable, the
explanatory variables, and/or the error term from neigh-
boring countries are called spatial lags following the spa-
tial econometrics literature, a growing subfield in
econometrics dealing with spatial interactions among
geographical units, in this case countries. Two crucial
issues involved in specifying a spatial econometric model
are the choice of the type of spatial lags and the choice of
a weight matrix that specifies who a country’s neighbors
are. Up to now most studies only consider one type of
spatial lag and do not test different weight matrices
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against each other. Additional but non-spatial issues are
whether or not to control for habit persistence, whether
to take the defense burden or the level of military expen-
ditures as the dependent variable, and whether country
and time fixed effects need to be controlled for. These
issues are introduced in the next section.
The objective of this study is to establish a rationale
for the different spatial lags and spatial weight matrices,
apply a testing procedure that can identify which types
of spatial lags in combination with which type of spatial
weight matrix best fit the data, and provide a clearer
understanding of the impact of neighboring countries
on military expenditure. Accordingly, this study con-
siders four spatial econometric models specifications
and eight potential specifications of the spatial weight
matrix in an empirical analysis. Using a Bayesian com-
parison approach developed by LeSage (2014, 2015),
we test these 32 (4  8) combinations within a com-
mon framework.
As the theoretical background for extending empirical
models of military expenditures with spatial lags, and to
place the results into perspective, we also present a simple
economic model. Departing from a neo-classical welfare
model that makes security an integral component
(Smith, 1989, 1995), we extend the security function
to include the military expenditures and economic, polit-
ical, and strategic factors that mark other countries
(Brueckner, 2003). In addition, we test for the existence
of country spillover effects, defined as the marginal
impact of a change in one explanatory variable in country
j on the defense burden or military expenditures of coun-
try i (i 6¼ j). These spillover effects can be derived from
the reduced form of a spatial econometric model (we
provide mathematical details in the next section) and
offer useful additions to the direct effects that measure
only the marginal impact on the dependent variable per-
taining to the focal country itself.
In the next two sections, we detail our spatial econo-
metric methodology for military expenditure contexts,
together with the basic economic-theoretical back-
ground explanation for spatial lags. After introducing
the explanatory variables, data and sources, and the
different spatial weight matrices being examined, we
present the results of our empirical analysis. The final
section concludes.
Spatial lags and weights
Basically, there are three main types of spatial lags that
can be used to explain the defense burden of a
country (LeSage & Pace, 2009; Elhorst, 2014). First,
an endogenous spatial lag measures whether the defense
burden of country i depends on the defense burden of
other countries j (j 6¼ i), or vice versa, resulting in the
spatial autoregressive (SAR) model that appears in several
studies. For example, Quiroz Flores (2011) uses cross-
section data from the World Bank (WB) to explain the
defense burden indicator across 168 countries in the year
2000. Goldsmith (2007) also uses cross-section data, in
this case from 129 countries in 1991 extracted from the
Correlates of War (COW) project, but also anticipates
that the indicator depends on the value observed in the
previous year, which helps control for habit persistence.
Finally, Skogstad (2016) employs time-series cross-
section data, or a spatial panel, related to 124 countries
over a period of 16 years (1993–2008) from the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Panel data allow one to control for country- and time-
specific effects (Baltagi, 2004).
Second, a spatial lag among the error terms might be
pertinent if countries share similar unobserved character-
istics or face similar unobserved institutional environ-
ments. Models that rely on this lag are known as
spatial error models (SEM), but they remain rather
unpopular. As Beck, Gleditsch & Beardsley (2006: 30)
explain, ‘The spatial lagged error model is odd (at least in
many applications), in that space matters in the “error
process” but not in the substantive portion of the model.’
Goldsmith (2007: 422) examines the plausibility of
SEM in addition to the SAR model, but only as a
‘first-cut of the topic’.
Third, exogenous spatial lags can measure whether the
defense burden of country i depends on the explanatory
variables of other countries j (j 6¼ i). If the number of
explanatory variables is K, the maximum number of lags
of this type is also K. Models containing these lags take
the designation of a spatial lag of X (SLX). Although
exogenous spatial lags are widely used, they are less com-
mon in the context of spatial econometric models. One
exception is Phillips (2014) who relies on an unbalanced
spatial panel of 135 developing countries taken from the
COW project over the period 1950–2006 to investigate
whether a country bordering a civil war zone spends
more on military expenditures than a country that is not
in such a situation.
Accordingly, K þ 2 spatial lags are possible. In addi-
tion to the SAR, SEM, and SLX models with one type of
spatial lag, alternative models combine two or even three
types of spatial lags. We introduce these combination
models in the section on spillovers.
Another crucial issue for explaining military expendi-
tures using variables observed in other countries is
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determining which set of countries might affect the focal
nation. Generally, mutual relationships among countries
are modeled by the so-called spatial weight matrix W,
whose elements can depend on geographical, economic,
or political distances between countries. Goldsmith
(2007) explores two specifications: a binary contiguity
matrix based on land or maritime borders and an inverse
distance matrix based on the great circle distance between
the capital cities of countries. Skogstad (2016: 33) includes
three additional specifications, based on whether countries
have ‘the ability to project their military power worldwide’,
and Quiroz Florez (2011) uses two principles to construct
seven potential specifications. For example, if the geogra-
phical distance between the capital cities between countries
is less than cut-off points of 1,000, 2,000, 4,000, or 8,000
km, the countries might be assumed to be neighbors. A
second principle is based on alliance membership.
As these various approaches imply, one of the biggest
problems in empirical spatial econometric research is
choosing among different model specifications and spec-
ifications ofW. Too many studies only consider one type
of spatial lag, resulting in just an SAR, SEM, or SLX
model, without testing model specifications against one
another or considering potential extensions that include
additional types of spatial lags. The endogenous spatial
lag offers a well-accepted explanation of the military
defense burden that is embedded in economic-
theoretical literature (as detailed further in the section
on theory), but its impact might be overestimated,
whether due to the omission of exogenous spatial lags
or of country- and time-specific effects, as demonstrated
by Corrado & Fingleton (2012) and Lee & Yu (2010)
using Monte Carlo simulations. In an effort to advance
this research stream, we consider combinations of differ-
ent types of spatial lags, test the model specifications
against one another, and determine whether country-
and time-specific effects are jointly significant.
A related issue is the choice of the spatial weight
matrix. The aforementioned studies consider different
specifications of this matrix, so this choice is of crucial
importance. However, none of the cited studies test the
suggested specifications against one another. Generally,
they present and discuss the results for the different
specifications mainly to check whether they are robust
to the choice of the specification; they do not identify
which specification is most likely.
Spatial model of military expenditures
A spatial econometric model is a linear regression model
extended to include spatial lags in the dependent
variable, the explanatory variables, the error term, or
some combination thereof. Including all spatial lags
yields a so-called general spatial nesting model
Dt ¼ WDt þ Xt þWXtþ þ t þ ut ð1aÞ
ut ¼ Wut þ t ð1bÞ
where Dt denotes an N  1 vector of the log of the
defense burden indicator, that is, military expenditure
(M) as a ratio of GDP (Y) for every country
(i ¼ 1, . . . , N) in the sample during time period t
(t ¼ 1, . . . , T); Xt is an N  K matrix of exogenous
explanatory variables associated with the K  1 vector ;
W is an N  N non-negative spatial weight matrix
describing the neighbors of a country, whose diagonal
elements are 0 because a country cannot be its own
neighbor; and WDt represents the endogenous spatial
lag, WXt the exogenous spatial lags, and Wut the spatial
lag among the error terms. The scalars  and , as well as
the K 1 vector of parameters , measure the strength of
these spatial lags. Furthermore,  is a vector of country
fixed effects, t is a time fixed effect, and Et is a vector of
error terms. Whether we should include country and
time fixed effects is a question to be tested.
Theory
The rationale for this spatial econometric model derives
from Smith (1989, 1995) and Brueckner (2003).
According to Smith, nation states can be represented as
rational agents that maximize a social welfare function Ui
depending on security Si and civilian output Ci:
Ui ¼ U ðSi;CiÞ ð2Þ
Other studies also depart from a social welfare model
(e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2007; Dunne & Perlo-
Freeman, 2003a,b; Nordhaus, Oneal & Russett,
2012). Maximizing the social welfare function is subject
to a budget constraint on military spending and a secu-
rity function that determines security in terms of the
country’s own and other countries’ military forces. The
budget constraint takes the form:
Yi ¼ PcCi þ PmMi ð3Þ
where Yi represents the national income or GDP of
country i, and Pc and Pm are the prices of civilian output
Ci and real military spending Mi. According to Smith
(1995), security, similar to utility or welfare, is unobser-
vable and thus can be measured by the military expen-
ditures of the country, in combination with other
economic, political, or strategic variables, denoted Xi.
Following literature on strategic interactions among
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governments (see Brueckner, 2003), the level of security
in a particular country also depends on the military
expenditures of other countries and their economic,
political, and strategic variables. For example, the (per-
ceived) security of a country might diminish if a neigh-
boring country increases its military expenditures, gets
involved in an international or civil war, or undergoes a
political regime change (we explain these variables in
more detail in the next section). IfWMi andWXi denote
the counterparts of Mi and Xi observed in neighboring
countries, we can formalize the security function as:
Si ¼ SðMi; WMi; Xi;WXiÞ ð4Þ
Maximizing the social welfare function in Equation (2),
subject to the budget constraint in Equation (3) and the
security function in Equation (4), yields the following
military expenditure demand function:
Mi ¼ M ðWMi;Yi;WYi; Xi;WXiÞ ð5Þ
which represents a reaction function – that is, country i’s
best response to the choices of other countries regarding
their military expenditures, income levels, and other con-
trol variables.
The magnitude of the slope of this reaction function,
represented by the spatial autoregressive parameter  in
Equation (1), is of interest for the current study. According
to Goldsmith (2007), this magnitude depends on three
factors. First, in Richardson’s (1960) classical arms race,
the greater a country’s arms stock, the greater its neighbors’
stocks will be. Second, alliances might mitigate this factor,
because a state with a high stock may be surrounded by
neighbors with low stocks, and a 0 coefficient occurs
because its arms stock has no effect on the stocks of its
neighbors. In this scenario, a nation is not alarmed when
neighboring countries increase their arms stocks, and no
spiraling arms race is initiated. When several neighboring
countries form an alliance, some members might even
avoidmaking additional investments in defense or cut back
their defense expenditures, in a formof free-riding behavior
(Sandler & Hartley, 2001). Third, if a country can distin-
guish offensive from defensive arms build-ups by its neigh-
bors, several countries may maintain minimal defensive
forces, as long as no offensive action takes place.
Dynamics
In addition to a static model, Goldsmith (2007) consid-
ers a dynamic version that includes the temporal lag of
the dependent variable, Dt–1, to control for habit persis-
tence. That is, military expenditure measured by the
defense burden indicator is subject to budgetary inertia
because spending depends on decisions made in previous
periods and might be subject to bureaucratic institutions
(DiGiuseppe, 2015). According to Goldsmith, the coef-
ficient of this variable was 0.802 when using distance
weights and 0.715 when using contiguity weights; for
DiGiuseppe, it ranged from 0.852 to 0.997. In both
studies, the coefficient was highly significant (1% level).
Beck, Gleditsch & Beardsley (2006) also discuss the
possibility of including a one-period lag in the spatially
lagged dependent variable, which may be denoted
WDt–1. Korniotos (2010) applies this model to explain
annual consumption growth in US states during the
period 1966–98 and interprets the coefficients of the
temporal and space-time lags of the dependent variable
as measures of the relative strength of internal and exter-
nal habit persistence. This extension reads as
Dt ¼ 	Dt1 þ WDt þ 
WDt1 þ Xt þWXt
þ þ t þ ut ; and ð6aÞ
ut ¼ Wut þ t ð6bÞ
also known as the dynamic general spatial nesting model
(Firmino Costa da Silva, Elhorst & daMota Silveira Neto,
2017). Yildrim & O¨cal (2016) use this model to explain
the impact of military expenditures on economic growth.
Expenditures and defense burden
Some discussion in prior literature pertains to whether to
employ the log of a state’s military expenditure while con-
trolling for its economic size or the ratio of a state’s military
expenditure to its GDP (see DiGiuseppe, 2015). When
two countries are of comparable size (e.g.United States and
Russia;Namibia and Angola), one country likely adjusts its
defense burden to match that of the other country. How-
ever, if the sizes of two neighboring countries vary more
substantially (e.g. United States and Mexico), this adjust-
mentmechanism seemsunlikely.The impact of an increase
in M in Mexico on that of the United States likely differs
from the impact of an increase inM in theUnited States on
that of Mexico. We can rewrite Equation (5) as
Mi
Yi
¼ M W MiYi ; Yi;WYi; Xi;WXi
 
; similarly, Equation





¼ 	 ln Mt1
Yt1
 








þ Y lnðYtÞ þ YWlnðYtÞ þ þ t þ ut
ð7Þ
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where the economic size of a country denoted by Y is
separated from the other explanatory variables X, the
notation ‘ln’ indicates that military expenditures and the
level of GDP are expressed in natural logarithms, and
the (natural) log ratio between M and Y serves as the
dependent variable.1 Then we can rewrite Equation (7) as
lnðMtÞ ¼ 	 lnðMt1Þ þ W lnðMtÞ þ 
W lnðMt1Þ
þ Xt þWXtþ ðY þ 1ÞlnðYtÞ
þ ðY  ÞW lnðYtÞ  	 lnðYt1Þ
 
W lnðYt1Þ þ þ t þ ut
ð8Þ
showing that the spatial autoregressive coefficients  and 

reflect both the impact of the ratio of military expenditure
to GDP observed in neighboring countries at time t and
t–1 on that of the focal country (Equation (7)) and the
impact of the level of military expenditure observed in
neighboring countries on that of the focal country (Equa-
tion (8)). The same principle applies to the coefficients
 and  of the X and WX variables. Only with respect to
the GDP variable is there a notable difference. If Y ¼ 0
in Equation (7), then in Equation (8), the level of military
expenditure increases proportionally with its level of GDP
in the short term; it increases less than proportionally if
1 < Y < 0 and more than proportionally if Y > 0.
One issue (raised by one reviewer) is whether temporal
lags of GDP (lnðYtÞ and W lnðYt1Þ) should also be
included. We test this by showing what happens if the
coefficients of these variables are set to zero.2
To further understand the impact of GDP observed
in neighboring countries, we also need to introduce
direct and spatial spillover effects.
Spillovers
Spatial econometric models often focus on country spil-
lover effects, such as whether a change to the level of
GDP in a particular country affects the defense burden
ratio or level of military expenditures in neighboring
countries. Comparisons of point estimates, such as those
derived from non-spatial models that do not account for
spatial lags in neighboring countries, with the findings of
spatial econometric models, or of different spatial econo-
metric models mutually, may lead to erroneous conclu-
sions. As LeSage & Pace (2009) demonstrate, a partial
derivative interpretation can offer a more valid basis for
testing this hypothesis, but only for cross-sectional data.
Departing from a dynamic general spatial nesting model
based on spatial panel data, Elhorst (2014) shows that
the matrix of partial derivatives of the expected value
of the dependent variable with respect to the kth








¼ ½ð1 	ÞI  ðþ 
ÞW 1½kIN þ kW  ð9Þ
whose diagonal elements represent long-term impacts on
the dependent variable of unit 1 up to N if the kth
explanatory variable in the own country changes, while
its off-diagonal elements represent the long-term impacts
on the dependent variable if the kth explanatory variable
in other countries changes. These impacts are indepen-
dent of t, provided that the spatial weight matrix W does
not change over time, and error terms drop out due to the
use of expectations. LeSage & Page (2009) define the
direct effect as the average diagonal element of the full
N  N matrix expression on the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (9); the indirect effect (i.e. country spillover effects for
the current study) is the average row or column sum of the
off-diagonal elements. Short-term direct and country
spillover effects can be obtained by setting 	 ¼ 
 ¼ 0.
Departing from this partial derivative interpretation,
we also can identify the impact of a change in the level of
GDP observed in a particular country on the military







¼ ½ð1 	ÞI  ðþ 
ÞW 1½ðY þ 1 	ÞIN
þ ðY   
ÞW 
ð10Þ
1 Some studies use the defense burden indicator as the dependent
variable, to avoid currency conversion problems or the need to deflate
the military expenditure and GDP variables. However, if the level of
GDP is controlled, the problem of currency conversion remains.
2 Another question is whether this potential feedback effect of
military expenditures on the level of GDP is addressed in the
current study. When taking military expenditures as the dependent
variable (Equation (8)), it is not. When taking the defense burden as
the dependent variable, it is partly since the endogeneity of Yt or Yt–1
in the denominator of the first three right-hand-side terms of
Equation (7) will be accounted for. Since the potential endogeneity
of Yt–1 in the sixth and seventh right-hand-side terms is not
accounted for, the signs, magnitudes, and significance levels of all
variables may change in theory. However, since the model is severely
tested and the results of these tests point in the same direction, the
effect of treating GDP as endogenous also regarding these latter two
terms may be expected to be limited. See Halleck Vega & Elhorst
(2015) for a similar example.
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The preceding discussion assumes that all spatial lags
are included. In Table I we provide an overview of some
simpler and more commonly used models in spatial
econometrics literature, including their ability to calcu-
late country spillovers. In particular, a limitation of SEM
is that it imposes restrictions on the parameters ( ¼ 0,
¼ 0), so the off-diagonal elements of the matrix expres-
sion on the right-hand side of Equation (9) – that is, the
country spillover effects – are reduced to 0. Accordingly,
SEM cannot effectively measure the effects of spillovers
(see also Beck, Gleditsch & Beardsley, 2006). For the
SAR and SAC models, a proportionality relationship
arises between the direct and spillover effects; if the ratio
of spillover to direct effects for variable k equals a certain
number, it equals this number for any other variable
(Elhorst, 2010). From an empirical perspective, this link
is unlikely. Therefore, only in models that include exo-
genous spatial lags (SLX, spatial Durbin model [SDM],
spatial Durbin error model [SDEM]) can the spillover
effects take different values across variables, in relation to
their corresponding direct effects. Reinforcing the
economic-theoretical derivation of the military expendi-
ture demand function in Equation (5), this rationale
provides a second reason to consider exogenous spatial
lags observed in neighboring countries.
Finally, country spillover effects could be local or glo-
bal. Local spillovers occur when  ¼ 0 and  6¼ 0, and
countries are connected. If two countries i and j are
unconnected, such that wij ¼ 0, a change in xik of coun-
try i cannot affect the dependent variable of country j,
and vice versa. Global spillovers instead occur when
 6¼ 0 and  ¼ 0, regardless of whether countries are
connected, so a change to xik of country i due to the
spatial multiplier matrix (I–W)1 gets transmitted to all
other countries, even if wij ¼ 0. If military conflicts or
the tension between countries at a local level can spread
to other countries across the continent or around the
world, even if they are not directly involved in the conflict,
then the SDM or SAR specifications make more sense, due
to their ability to capture such global spillovers. If other
countries do not get involved though, the SDEM specifi-
cation may be more appropriate, in that it captures only
local country spillovers. The choice between local and
global spillovers also relates to the specification of W. A
sparse spatial weight matrix with only a limited number of
non-zero elements, such as a binary contiguity matrix, is
more likely to occur in combination with a global spillover
model ( 6¼ 0), whereas a dense spatial weight matrix in
which many off-diagonal elements are non-zero (e.g.
inverse distance matrix) is more likely in combination with
a local spillover model (¼ 0,  6¼ 0). The choice of model
and spatial weight matrix thus might be improved if they
take place within a common framework.
Data, variables, and spatial weight matrices
The sample consists of 144 countries (see the Online
appendix), over the period 1993–2007, for which we
gathered data on the defense burden indicator from sev-
eral sources: the WB, SIPRI, and the COW project. We
also check the sensitivity of the results to the datasets.
Spatial econometric research requires that the spatial
panel be balanced; missing observations should be
avoided as far as possible. This is because most software
available for estimating spatial panels (Matlab, R, Stata)
is written for complete datasets. Unfortunately, our data-
sets have missing observations: 1.5% of them in the
COW and 7.1% in the WB/SIPRI dataset. By imple-
menting trends from one dataset to the other, though,
we construct a complete set of 2,160 observations (N ¼
144, T¼ 15), thereby assuming that the development of
military expenditures over time in both datasets are com-
parable with each other. Due to this we were able to
enlarge the sample from 120 to 144 countries. Yet for
various reasons, some countries still are missing.3
Table I. Spatial econometric models with different combina-













Wu ¼0, ¼0 Zero by
construction
SLX, Spatial lag of
X model















WX, Wu ¼0 Fully flexible,
local
*Also known as the spatial lag model. **Also known as the SARAR
or Cliff-Ord model.
3 The missing nations are Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland,
and Serbia in Europe; Afghanistan, Brunei, Iraq, North Korea, and
Myanmar in Asia; Eritrea, Libya, and Somalia in Africa; Belize, Costa
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Countries with adjacent neighbors that are not in the
sample are indicated in the Online appendix; we detail
how we dealt with this issue subsequently. Nevertheless,
the sample is appropriate in that it contains multiple
countries that frequently are engaged in tensions, such
as Cuba, Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Syrian, Kuwait, Vietnam,
Mali, Ethiopia, both Congos, and Colombia. We also
collected data from multiple continents (Europe, Asia,
Africa, North and South America, and Australia), so we
can investigate whether the strength of the direct and
country spillover effects differ across continents.
Similar to previous studies, we consider three cate-
gories of explanatory variables: economic, political, and
strategic. The economic factors are GDP and popula-
tion. The (log of the level of) GDP variable follows
from the derived military demand function in Equation
(5). We converted the GDP data into US 2005 dollars.
In addition, we can measure the size of a country by its
population, in line with prior literature that highlights
the benefits of such a measure, including scale effects
(Dunne & Perlo-Freeman, 2003a,b; Groot & van den
Berg, 2009), security (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002), and
public good effects (Fordham & Walker, 2005). How-
ever, the correlation coefficient between these two vari-
ables is high (approximately 0.63), so we decided to
exclude this variable.4 Instead, if a country in the sam-
ple is adjacent to a country that is not part of the sample
(see footnote 3), we control for the (log of the) popu-
lation size of the non-sampled country relative to that of
the sampled country. Countries that have not been
sampled often represent serious threats to their neigh-
bors, especially if they are relatively large. Therefore,
this alternative variable might shed new light on the
potential threat. The population data came from the
Penn World Tables.5
For the political factors, we use the political regime of
a country, which often functions as a determinant of
military expenditures. Maizels & Nissanke (1986) sug-
gest that the nature of the state is an important determi-
nant; a military dictatorship likely maintains a larger
military establishment than a democracy. Many studies
adopt similar reasoning (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2007;
Goldsmith, 2007; Groot & van den Berg, 2009; Mulli-
gan, Gil & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Fordham & Walker
(2005) provide a more thorough reasoning, based on
international relations theory and Kantian liberalism,
arguing that liberal states allocate fewer resources to their
militaries than autocratic states. Furthermore, domestic
political pressures can lead to these differences. Higher
military expenditures during peacetime may adversely
affect the nation as a whole, because resources allocated
to military purposes come at the expense of support for
highly valued social goods, such as education. Such mil-
itary spending also might threaten civil liberties and
political freedom – values with high standing in demo-
cratic countries. Therefore, most people in democratic
countries likely oppose high military spending. In con-
trast, in autocratic states, small groups of people benefit
from preparations for war, if they have the power to
influence or control military decisions, and the military
can function in a suppressive role, eliminating potential
competitors of a dictator (Groot & van den Berg, 2009).
It is thus in the best interest of the dictator to support the
military and allocate substantial resources to military
budgets. We accordingly expect a positive relationship
between military expenditures and more autocratic
regimes, but a negative relationship with democratic
regimes. To describe the political regime of each country,
we use the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV project
dataset (Marshall, 2014). This indicator ranges from –10
to þ10, where –10 indicates strongly autocratic and
þ10 is strongly democratic.
Finally, strategic factors involving relations between
two or more countries may affect military spending.
Previous studies indicate a significant relationship of
international wars (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2002,
2007; Dunne & Perlo-Freeman, 2003a,b; Goldsmith,
2007) and also suggest the impact of the closely related
variable of civil war. According to Collier & Hoeffler
(2002), civil wars are now many times more common
than interstate wars, and the risk of rebellion may be
more influential on levels of military expenditure than
is the threat of an international war. The effects of inter-
nal and external wars might differ (Fordham & Walker,
2005), so we distinguish them. Specifically, we extracted
data from the Major Episodes of Political Violence data-
set, as provided by the Center of Systemic Peace. For the
occurrence of international wars, we use the Inttot vari-
able, which sums the magnitude scores for international
violence and warfare. For civil wars, the Civtot variable is
composed of both civil and ethnic violence and warfare.
The scores for both types range from 0 (no war) to
Rica, and Haiti in North America; and Suriname and French Guyana
in South America.
4 We thank a reviewer for this suggestion. The second largest
correlation coefficient – 0.32 between GDP and the political
regime variable – is so low that multicollinearity is no longer
considered a problem.
5 Downloaded from https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu at the time of this
study. At the time of writing, these data are available at http://
cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/pwt.html.
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10 (greatest), defined by the systematic and sustained use
of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at
least 500 directly related deaths over the course of an
episode of war (Marshall, 2010).
For this study, we use three principles to construct
eight spatial weight principles:
1. Sharing a common land or maritime border
(Goldsmith, 2007; Skogstad, 2016) implies the
first-order binary contiguity matrix, W1. Mari-
time borders are based on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and additional
sources further explaining this convention.
2. The influence of a country might go beyond its
immediate neighbors, as implied by the inverse
distance matrix by Goldsmith (2007) and the
different cut-off points by Quiroz Florez
(2011). Therefore, we also consider a second-
order binary contiguity matrix, W2.
3. A country may respond to the threat of even
more distant countries, which is also the main
reason that elements of the weight matrix within
a certain radius of a country are not always set to
0. We accordingly include a third-order binary
contiguity matrix, W3.
4. Quiroz Florez (2011) considers spatial weight
matrices based on alliances, which also might
be covered by the spatial autoregressive para-
meter  in Equation (1), corresponding to one
of the factors in Goldsmith’s (2006) model that
cause countries to maintain minimal defensive
forces. As an alternative, we can construct a so-
called Enemy matrix, according to countries that
are each other’s sworn enemies, using data from
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
5. A large overlap arises between Enemy andW1, so
we combine these matrices, such that wij is set to
equal 1 if the corresponding element in one of
these two underlying matrices also equals 1. This
matrix accordingly is denoted W1 þ Enemy.
6. Skogstad (2016) notes countries’ ability to proj-
ect their military power worldwide. The five
superpowers in the world, the United States,
Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France,
also are the permanent members of the UN Secu-
rity Council. Therefore, we construct a matrix in
which all five countries interact, then combine it
with the first-order binary contiguity matrix to
form W1 þ Superpowers.
7. The dominance of the United Kingdom and
France largely stems from their historical and
continuing role as colonizers of overseas terri-
tories. To distinguish each main country from
its overseas territories, we base our contiguity
matrices on immediate neighbors of the United
Kingdom and France within Europe. Another
way instead to model dominance is to assume
that the five superpowers react to foreign threats
everywhere, regardless of the country involved.
To operationalize this potential relationship, we
assume each country part of the dataset is a
‘neighbor’ of these five dominant countries, but
not vice versa. Combined with the first-order
binary contiguity matrix, this approach produces
the matrix W1 þ Dominance.6
8. An overall matrix combines the principles of first-
order binary contiguity, enemy, and super-
powers: W1 þ Enemy þ Superpowers.
Finally, all the matrices are row normalized, which is
standard in spatial econometrics literature when the
elements of W have a binary (0/1) character.
Results
Table II contains the Bayesian posterior model probabil-
ities of the different models (SAR, SDM, SEM, SDEM),
in combination with the eight proposed spatial weight
matrices. We calculated these probabilities for both static
and dynamic versions of the model specifications; the
latter also contain the defense burden indicator lagged
in time, space, and both space and time (Equations (6a)
versus (1a)). With these probabilities we can simultane-
ously identify the most likely spatial econometric model
and the most likely spatial weight matrix. The probabil-
ities are based on the log-marginal likelihood obtained by
integrating out all parameters of the model over the
entire parameter space on which they are defined. In
addition, they are normalized such that the probabilities
of all 32 combinations sum to 1. This normalization is
based on the (non-linear) property that the Bayesian
posterior model probability increases if the log-
6 To clarify the differences we take the UK as an example. The UK
shares a land border with Ireland, and maritime borders with Ireland,
Norway, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
France. These countries are considered to be neighbors as part of
W1. However, due to its overseas territories (for example, Gibraltar
and the Falkland islands), the UK also shares land or maritime
borders with countries not covered by W1. In addition, the UK
has been involved in peace missions and military conflicts in
countries with which it does not share a common border. The
latter two are covered by considering the matrix W1 þ Dominance.
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marginal likelihood value of one model or oneW exceeds
that of another model or W. Full details can be found in
LeSage (2014); the Matlab code used to carry out these
comparisons is available in LeSage (2015).
The results in Table II show that the SAR model
outperforms the other models in almost all 32 cases, for
both the WB/SIPRI and COW datasets. Row totals for
this model range from 0.5288 based on the first, to
0.9717 for the second dataset. This result is striking,
especially considering that the SAR model is much sim-
pler than the SDM specification and requires that the
coefficients of all exogenous spatial lags are jointly insig-
nificant ( ¼ 0). This finding corroborates previous
approaches by Goldsmith (2007), Quiroz Flores
(2011), and Skogstad (2016). The spatial interaction
among countries appears driven only by the endogenous
spatial lag, and countries adapt their defense burden ratio
(or military expenditures) to those of their neighbors but
not to other variables observed in neighboring countries.
Thus the extension of the security function with theWX
variable in Equation (4) seems unnecessary.
The most likely spatial weight matrix differs across the
two datasets. The COW dataset favors the first-order bin-
ary contiguity matrix, whose performance improves when
combined with the dominant position of the five super-
powers and the proposition that they react to military
activities all over the world. This matrix outperforms oth-
ers no matter which spatial econometric model is used.
The WB/SIPRI dataset instead favors the third-order bin-
ary contiguity matrix, in line with Quiroz Florez (2011),
who also usesWB data and sets the elements of the weight
matrix equal to 0 only outside a certain radius of a coun-
try. However, since the SAR model produces global coun-
try spillover effects, it is more likely to occur in
combination with a sparse spatial weight matrix. In view
of this, we determined the average number of neighbors of
each country in the sample based on these two W
matrices. It equals 9.3 for the W1 þ Dominance matrix
and 35.5 for the W3 matrix; in both cases the average
number of adjacent neighbors based solely on land or
maritime borders is 4.7. Departing from the principle of
sparsity, the W1þDominance matrix thus seems to offer
a better choice than the W3 matrix.
In Table III we report the estimation results of the
dynamic SAR specification, based on the COW dataset
and theW1þDominance matrix. The model parameters
were estimated using the bias-corrected maximum likeli-
hood estimator developed by Lee & Yu (2010).7 The
results confirm some of the results of previous studies. For
Table II. Simultaneous Bayesian comparison of model specifications and spatial weight matrices













SAR 0.1449 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0224 0.1435 0.2838 0.0244 0.6190
SDM 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0052 0.0119 0.0028 0.0279
SEM 0.0625 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0098 0.0676 0.1603 0.0111 0.3113
SDEM 0.0074 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0073 0.0202 0.0036 0.0418
COW
Dynamic model
SAR 0.2335 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0315 0.2547 0.4171 0.0350 0.9719
SDM 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0009
SEM 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0056 0.0118 0.0018 0.0252
SDEM 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0010 0.0001 0.0020
WB/SIPRI
Static model
SAR 0.0016 0.0061 0.5162 0.0020 0.0019 0.0015 0.0016 0.0019 0.5328
SDM 0.0081 0.0004 0.0520 0.0294 0.0055 0.0072 0.0081 0.0047 0.1155
SEM 0.0013 0.0044 0.2510 0.0040 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.2660
SDEM 0.0084 0.0003 0.0235 0.0275 0.0053 0.0076 0.0086 0.0086 0.0857
WB/SIPRI
Dynamic model
SAR 0.0382 0.0645 0.2365 0.0353 0.0390 0.0383 0.0381 0.0390 0.5288
SDM 0.0001 0.0002 0.0259 0.0287 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0551
SEM 0.0411 0.0480 0.0835 0.0387 0.0382 0.0413 0.0411 0.0382 0.3701
SDEM 0.0001 0.0002 0.0181 0.0272 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0459
The highest probability in each row is in italics and the probabilities in each block sum to 1.
Source: Own calculations, based on LeSage (2014, 2015).
7 The bias correction is necessary since the demeaning procedure to
wipe out the country and time fixed effects in a standard panel data
model (Baltagi, 2004) produces a singularity among the transformed
error terms if the model is augmented with a spatial lag in the
dependent variable, causing the asymptotic distributions of the
parameters not to be properly centered.
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example, the defense burden indicator strongly depends on
its value in the previous year, or internal habit persistence;
its coefficient amounts to 0.633 and is highly significant
(1% level). We find no evidence of what Korniotis (2010)
labels external habit persistence; the coefficient of the
defense burden observed in neighboring countries in the
previous period is negative but insignificant (–0.061, t-
value¼ –0.95).However, countries respond to the defense
burden set in neighboring countries in the same year, such
that the coefficient  takes a positive value of 0.244 and is
highly significant (t-value ¼ 7.44), in line with the com-
mon feature of horizontal interaction among countries
(Brueckner, 2003). The inclusion of the endogenous spa-
tial lag has a downward effect on the internal habit persis-
tence parameter, which helps explain why studies that do
not control for an endogenous spatial lag tend to find
slightly higher values for the persistence parameter (e.g.
DiGiuseppe [2015] versusGoldsmith [2007]). A necessary
and sufficient condition for stationarity, 	 þ þ 
 ¼
0:633þ 0:244 0:061 ¼ 0:816 < 1, also is satisfied.
To investigate the (null) hypothesis whether country fixed
effects may be replaced by a common intercept and thus
are jointly insignificant, we performed a likelihood ratio
(LR) test. The results (349.6, with 143 degrees of free-
dom [df], p < 0.01) indicate that this hypothesis must be
rejected. Similarly, the hypothesis that the time-period
fixed effects are jointly insignificant must be rejected
(34.2, 13 df, p < 0.01). Therefore, we included these
factors in all regressions. This finding also implies that
the parameter estimates in previous studies that do not
control for fixed effects, because they employ cross-
sectional data, might be biased.
The coefficient estimates and short-term direct effects
estimates derived from the parameter estimates using
Equation (9) exhibit a plausible model structure. The
direct effect of the GDP variable on the defense burden
indicator is negative and significant but greater than –1;
military expenditures increase with the level of GDP but
less than proportionally. This result follows from the
direct effect of GDP on the military expenditure (M)
Table III. Results of the dynamic SAR model, with defense burden ratio as the dependent variable, COW data, and W¼W1þ
Dominance
Determinants Coefficients


























































































































t-values are in parentheses. Country and time-period fixed effects are included. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%; ysignificant at 10%.
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itself, as calculated using Equation (10). Non-sampled
countries are experienced as threats to their neighbors,
but the coefficient of this variable is not significant. The
impact of an international war on a country’s military
expenditure is positive and weakly significant, as well as
greater in magnitude than that of civil wars (cf. Fordham
& Walker, 2005). The direct effect of the political
regime variable, –0.009, is small but weakly significant,
implying that the defense burden indicator decreases
with a higher level of democracy but increases with a
higher level of autocracy (lower value on the –10 to
þ10 scale). This finding is in line with our expectation
that relatively more autocratic regimes undertake higher
military expenditures, and more democratic countries
have relatively lower military expenditures. The five
explanatory variables exhibit similar significance levels
for the long-term direct effects, but their magnitudes
almost triple.
Three of the five country spillover effects appear to be
(weakly) significant in the short term, and one in the
long term. It concerns the impact of GDP, political
regime, and international wars. Military expenditures
do not only increase with the level of GDP in the own
country, but to a lesser extent also with that in neighbor-
ing countries. Countries also tend to spend more if they
are adjacent to autocratic states or if neighboring states
are involved in an international war. Conversely, they
tend to spend less if they are adjacent to democratic
states. These spillover effects are approximately one-
third of the corresponding direct effects. This one-
third is due to the proportionality relationship between
the direct and spillover effects imposed by the SAR
model. If we do not impose the restriction that the coef-
ficients of all exogenous spatial lags are zero ( 6¼ 0) by
estimating the dynamic SDM specification, which allows
the country spillover effects to have the flexibility to take
any value, they all lose their significance (see the column
‘Short-term effects SDM’ of Table III). However, in line
with the Bayesian results in Table II, this model exten-
sion is no improvement over the dynamic SAR model:
the hypothesis about whether it can be simplified to the
dynamic SAR model, H0 :  ¼ 0, cannot be rejected
(3.6, 6 df, p ¼ 0.45). This implies that the empirical
evidence in favor of the three significant country spil-
lover effects in the short term hinges strongly on the
previous finding that the spatial interaction among coun-
tries is driven only by the endogenous spatial lag.
The insignificant country spillover effects in the
dynamic SDM also might reflect the focus on the
defense burden, the data being used, or the restriction
that the parameters are homogeneous across countries
located on different continents. We report and discuss
the results of three robustness checks, thereby focusing
on short-term direct and country spillover effects. First,
the defense burden indicator is replaced by military
expenditures as the dependent variable, while the coeffi-
cients of lnðYtÞ and W lnðYt1Þ are set to zero. The
explanation behind this robustness check was set out
below Equation (7), and the results are reported in the
last column of Table III. As expected, the direct and
country spillover effects are hardly affected by this. We
find short-term effects that are similar in magnitude and
significance levels. Only the short-term effects of GDP
become much smaller. The reason is that the coefficients
of lnðYtÞ and W lnðYt1Þ, when estimated, appear any-
thing but zero and insignificant. Consequently, this zero
restriction needs to be rejected.
The second check re-estimates the dynamic SAR spe-
cification with the WB/SIPRI dataset and replaces the
spatial weight matrix by the third-order binary contigu-
ity matrix, in line with the results in Table II. The first
column of Table IV shows that the direct effects of the
GDP and the political regime variables decrease in mag-
nitude, and become less significant or even insignificant.
Conversely, the direct effect of civil wars increases in
magnitude and, just as the direct effect of international
wars, becomes significant. The biggest change occurs in
the country spillover effects. None of them is significant
any more. According to this dataset, countries adapt
their defense burden to that of their neighbors, but this
has no effect on the country spillovers caused by the
explanatory variables.
With our third robustness check, we note that such
differences in emphasis also occur when researchers carry
out separate analyses for countries located in Europe,
Asia, America, and Asia (Gleditsch, 2002; Goldsmith,
2006, 2007; Quiroz Flores, 2011), in these cases based
on the COW dataset.8 Since the choice of model and of
W need to be made simultaneously, we repeated the
Bayesian comparison approach and selected the most
likely spatial econometric model and the most likely
spatial weight matrix for each continent. The results
differ per continent and are reported in Columns 2–5
of Table III. The direct effect of non-sampled countries,
which was insignificant up to now, especially shows up
in Europe. These countries were part of the former
Yugoslavia; in the aftermath of that war, at the beginning
of our observation period, they were still reporting very
8 Due to insufficient observations, the Australian continent is left
aside here, while America consists of North and South America.
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high military expenditure levels, probably to protect
themselves against countries surrounding them that were
not part of the sample. The direct and country spillover
effects of the GDP of countries located in the Americas
are the only ones that appear significantly greater than 1.
Apparently, American countries adapt their military
expenditures more than proportionally to their own level
of GDP and that of their neighbors, which is under-
standable considering that the average defense burden
indicator on this continent is the lowest of all other
continents during our sample period. However, in Eur-
ope, this country spillover effect is instead negative and
significant. Apparently, European countries not only
adapt their military expenditures less than proportionally
to their level of GDP, but they even reduce it if their
neighbors’ GDPs grow. As Sandler & Hartley (2001)
argue, many European countries are members of an alli-
ance (NATO), so they might not make additional invest-
ments in defense or reduce their defense expenditures to
free-ride on their alliance partners. American countries
are strongly affected by civil wars in neighboring coun-
tries (Mexico, Colombia, and Peru [until 1997]), in line
with Phillips’s (2014) finding for developing countries.
American countries are also weakly significantly affected
by the political regimes of their neighbors. Like-minded
countries on this continent, either autocratic or demo-
cratic, tend to push up each other’s military spending,
similar to the result found for the GDP spillover effects.
Finally, African countries are strongly affected by neigh-
boring countries involved in an international war. In
summary, when we conduct the analysis again, splitting
the data across different continents, some or other coun-
try spillover effects become significant.
Conclusions
With this article, we have sought to gain better under-
standing of the impact of neighboring countries on mil-
itary expenditures. The endogenous spatial lag appears to
be the main driving force of spatial interaction effects; its
coefficient takes a positive and significant value of 0.244.
This positive value is in line with a common feature of
horizontal interactions among governments (Brueckner,
2003) and with the SAR model applied in several previ-
ous studies (Goldsmith, 2007; Quiroz Flores, 2011;
Skogstad, 2016). The evidence in favor of the SAR
model is based on our application of a Bayesian compar-
ison approach to four potential models (SAR, SEM,
SDM, and SDEM), a method developed only recently.
The SAR model produces global spillover effects –
that is, countries adapt their defense burden indicator
or military expenditures to those of other countries, even
if they are not neighbors – so the spatial weight matrix is
likely to be sparse. The first-order binary contiguity
Table IV. Robustness checks for short-term direct and spillover effects
(1) WB/SIPRI data (2) Europe (3) Asia (4) America (5) Africa




























































































































Observations 2,016 476 616 280 616
R2 0.846 0.841 0.759 0.616 0.81
See the notes to Table III. Column 1 is as SAR in Table III but based onWB/SIPRI data, W¼W3. Column 2 Europe: SDM andW¼W1þ
Enemy. Column 3 Asia: SAR and W ¼ W1 þ Dominance. Column 4 America (North and South): SDM and W ¼ W1. Column 5 Africa:
SDM and W ¼ W3. Russia is considered part of both Europe and Asia. Australia and New Zealand are excluded.
788 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(6)
matrix based on land or maritime borders, extended to
include both the dominant position of the five countries
that are permanent members of the UN Security Coun-
cil and the proposition that they react to military activ-
ities of all countries, in combination with COW data,
comes closest to this property of sparseness.
In contrast with the endogenous spatial lag, it is hard
to find strong empirical evidence in favor of country
spillover effects. Three variables – GDP, international
wars, and political regime – produce (weakly) signifi-
cant spillover in the short term, but this finding hinges
strongly on the previous finding that the spatial inter-
action among countries is driven mainly by the endo-
genous spatial lag. We also find empirical evidence in
favor of country spillover effects of civil wars when we
conduct a separate analysis for American countries.
Similarly, we find evidence in favor of spillover effects
of the relative population size of non-sampled countries
among European countries, of the political regime
among American countries, and international wars
among African countries.
We encourage the use of spatial panels rather than
cross-sectional data in further research, because these
data offer means to control for habit persistence and for
country and time fixed effects. Both of these types of
controls appear highly significant.
Replication data
The Online appendix, the dataset, codebook, and m-files
for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at
http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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